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1. Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been proposed [1],
many of them fundamentally ﬂawed by a lack of robustness and security. In the Letter [2], the
authors have proposed a symmetric cryptosystem based on chaotic oscillators. More precisely, let
N : LNeðRþÞ-LNeðRþÞ be a non-linear time-varying system, where LNeðRþÞ stands for the
extended LN-space on Rþ; and let S1 and S2 be two signal generators which generate the time
functions t/w1ðtÞ and t/w2ðtÞ; respectively. The encryption process is deﬁned by adding the
signal generator S2 to the output of the dynamic evolution of N: Explicitly, to encrypt a message
deﬁned by a train of pulses t/pðtÞ; of suitable width and of amplitude zero or one, is necessary to
compute the function uðtÞ ¼ pðtÞ þ w1ðtÞ; 8tX0: Then, uðtÞ is applied to the system N and its
output is added to w2ðtÞ: The ciphertext is then deﬁned to be cðtÞ ¼ ðNuÞðtÞ þ w2ðtÞ; 8tX0:
The decryption process consists of the two signal generators, S1 and S2; and a feedback system
Sðg; NÞ; where N is the non-linear system used in the encryption protocol and g is the gain of the
system. To decrypt a message cðtÞ; one subtracts w2ðtÞ from cðtÞ and the result is the input to the
system Sðg; NÞ: Its output, *uðtÞ; is a good, but noisy, approximation of uðtÞ; also, the difference
between w1ðtÞ and *uðtÞ gives *pðtÞ; which is a good, but noisy, approximation of pðtÞ: Using a low-
pass ﬁlter LðsÞ and a quantizer Q; the original message is obtained. In order to recover the original
message exactly, LðsÞ should be designed carefully. Although the authors seem to base the security
of their cryptosystem on the chaotic behaviour of the output of the non-linear system N; no
analysis of security is included.
In the present Letter the weaknesses of this system are discussed in Section 2 and its practical
implementation analyzed in Section 3.
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2. Attacks to the cryptosystem
In this section it is shown how to break the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. [2] when Dufﬁng’s
oscillator is used as the non-linear time-varying system [2, Section 3.1], which, in fact, is the ﬁrst
example explained in detail. The main problem with this cryptosystem lies on the fact that the
ciphertext is an analogue signal, whose waveform depends on the system parameter values and the
plaintext signal. Likewise, the detected signal before the quantizer depends on these same
parameters. The study of these signals provides the necessary information to recover a good
estimation of the system parameter values and the correct plaintext.
Consider the ﬁrst example in Ref. [2, Section 4.1], for Dufﬁng’s oscillator, represented by
N: .xðtÞ þ d ’xðtÞ  axðtÞ þ bxðtÞ3 ¼ uðtÞ; xð0Þ ¼ 0; ’xð0Þ ¼ 0: ð1Þ
In this example w1ðtÞ ¼ A cosot and w2ðtÞ  0: The key of the system is made by the oscillator’s
parameters ðd; a; bÞ; and the signal generator’s parameters ðA;oÞ: Following the example given, a
key is used which is formed by the following set of parameters:
a ¼ 10; b ¼ 100; d ¼ 1; A ¼ 1:5; o ¼ 3:76: ð2Þ
Dufﬁng’s oscillator is used operating in the chaotic region. This region is roughly characterized by
the following values of the parameters:
3pap15; 40pbp250; 0:5pdp1:7; 1pAp2; 0:5pop7: ð3Þ
The sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that the original plaintext can be recovered from
the ciphertext using a receiver system with parameter values considerably different from the ones
used by the sender. As a consequence, it is very economic to try different combinations of the
parameters until a reasonable approximation is reached. Although the parameter values can be
obtained with a very accurate precision, their knowledge is not necessary to recover the plaintext.
It has been found that the message can be decrypted even when b has an error of75%; d has an
error from 30% to þ60% and a has an absolute error of72 integers; with respect to the original
set of parameters (2).
Fig. 1 shows the power spectral analysis of the example ciphertext signal. As is observed, the
frequency of the forced oscillator is totally evident. The spectrum highest peak appears at the S1
signal generator frequency of o ¼ 3:76: Thus, by simply examining the ciphertext, one of the
elements of the key ðoÞ is obtained.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. Power spectral analysis of the ciphertext signal. The highest peak corresponds to the frequency of S1 and lies at
oE3:76:
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Next, the attacker uses a receiver for which A ¼ 0; and the rest of the parameters takes values
from the following sets:
a ¼ f5; 9; 13g; ð4Þ
b ¼f43; 47; 51; 56; 62; 68; 75; 82; 91; 100; 110;
120; 130; 145; 160; 180; 200; 220; 240g; ð5Þ
d ¼ f0:7; 1:3g: ð6Þ
This makes a total of 114 possible combinations, which should be tried one by one. To check
whether the choice of the parameters is good, one should look at the output of the low-pass ﬁlter
LðsÞ; called #pðtÞ: When the parameter values are slightly different from the right ones, then #pðtÞ will
look like a square signal summed with a pure sine. The frequency of this sine corresponds to the
value of o previously calculated from the spectrum of the ciphertext. The amplitude of this sine
corresponds exactly to the value of A used by the sender.
Next, the value of A just computed is used to regenerate the plaintext. Due to the low sensitivity
to the parameter values, although the exact values are unknown, the deciphered plaintext signal
will be equal (or very close) to the original one. In Fig. 2 the recovered plaintext is depicted for the
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Fig. 2. Plaintext recovery with inexact receiver parameter values. Time histories of: (a) plaintext; (b) recovered
plaintext; (c) #pðtÞ:
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following parameter values:
a ¼ 9; b ¼ 100; d ¼ 0:7; A ¼ 1:4; o ¼ 3:76: ð7Þ
The ﬁrst three values are taken from Eqs. (4)–(6). Although the parameter errors are 10%, 0%,
30%, 6.66%, and 0%, respectively, the plaintext is correctly recovered. These values could be
further reﬁned by varying them in an effort to approximate #pðtÞ to a square wave.
3. Difﬁculties of practical implementation
In this section the difﬁculties that this cryptosystem will face if it is practically implemented are
discussed.
3.1. Analogue transmission
The proposed cryptosystem seems to present serious problems in a real transmission, because
the recovered signal at the receiving end of the transmission path will be very difﬁcult to decrypt.
Apparently, the authors have only implemented a software simulation of the complete
encryption/decryption system, feeding the ciphertext (the output generated by the encryption
system) directly as the input to the decryption system. The generators S1 and S2; part of the
system key, look to be connected simultaneously and locally to both the encryption and
decryption systems.
In real-world applications, however, things happen in a very different way. Ideal transmission
lines introduce an unknown amount of attenuation and delay in the transmitted signal.
Furthermore, real transmission lines introduce distortion and noise too. Moreover, wireless
communication systems exhibit time-variable attenuation and delay.
Thus, the input signal at the receiver end c0ðtÞ and the transmitted signal cðtÞ will differ. In the
most favourable case, if it is assumed that an ideal line is being used, the received signal will be
c0ðtÞ ¼ kcðt þ tÞ; were k and t are the attenuation and delay of the line.
3.1.1. Synchronization
As the authors point out, most continuous chaotic cryptosystems described until now are based
on the synchronization of two chaotic systems. The claimed novelty of the present cryptosystem
relies on the lack of synchronization between encryption and decryption; but this is an erroneous
claim, because in the software simulations the authors have used a hidden synchronization
mechanism consisting of the local and simultaneous connection of generators S1 and S2 to both
the encryption and decryption systems.
In real world applications, given that transmission lines have limited bandwidth, when
transmitting to a remote system, signal delay will take place. The delay amount may vary for
different frequency components of the signal, depending on the line impulsive response. Thus, the
observed waveforms at sender and receiver ends may differ and it will be very difﬁcult to estimate
the right moment to start the receiving generators.
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Some measures should be taken to assure that both ends are using signal generators S1 and S2
with exactly the same phase in respect to the ciphertext. However, no measure is considered by the
authors. Hence, the receiver end’s generators will never generate the adequate signal.
3.1.2. Attenuation
Another factor to be considered is the line attenuation. No continuous transmission or storage
system (cable, optical, magnetic or wireless) grants that the received or reproduced signal
amplitude preserves the original amplitude. If the signal is transmitted over a switched network,
the attenuation will change each time that a new connection is made. If the signal is transmitted
over a wireless channel, the attenuation will vary depending on changing atmospheric conditions,
changing reﬂections, and changing multipath.
When transmitting a signal of known constant amplitude (e.g. square pulses or frequency
modulated sinusoids) it is possible to equalize the received signal, restoring the correct amplitude
level. But in the present case, as the signal is chaotic, its amplitude is varying in an unpredictable
fashion, so it is impossible any level restoring.
Therefore, it will be impossible to subtract w2 exactly at the receiver end. Hence, the signal r at
the input of the decryption system feedback loop will be rðtÞ ¼ c0ðtÞ  w2ðtÞ; i.e.
rðtÞ ¼ kðNuÞðt þ eÞ þ kw2ðt þ eÞ  w2ðtÞ; ð8Þ
where e is the time inaccuracy in the determination of the right moment to start the receiving
generators. Hence, the decrypted signal will be
yðtÞEðN1rÞðtÞ ¼ ðN1ðkðNuÞðt þ eÞ þ kw2ðt þ eÞ  w2ðtÞÞÞðtÞ: ð9Þ
As N is a non-linear chaotic map and due to the sensitive dependence on the initial conditions that
characterizes chaos [3, p. 119], the decrypted signal yðtÞ will never match the plaintext pðtÞ:
The recovered plaintext errors induced by the use of a real communication channel with
restricted bandwidth, attenuation and/or noise are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Moreover, the authors seem to base the security of their cryptosystem on the chaotic behaviour
of N; although no evidence of that is shown. In any case, the chaotic proﬁle of the output xðtÞ in
Dufﬁng’s oscillator (1) is not always guaranteed for every input uðtÞ ¼ pðtÞ þ w1ðtÞ; even in the
chaotic range (3), and the sensitive dependence on the initial conditions is diminished as they are
kept to be ﬁxed, xð0Þ ¼ 0; ’xð0Þ ¼ 0; in Dufﬁng’s equation (1).
3.2. Digital transmission
If a discretization of the ciphertext is sent instead of the dynamic evolution of the system N;
then there are two options.
In the ﬁrst one, the ciphertext is discretized only at the nodes i ¼ 0;y; n; where n is the number
of pulses of pðtÞ: Then, the ciphertext sent by the sender must be the triplets ðxðtiÞ; ’xðtiÞ; .xðtiÞÞ;
i ¼ 0;y; n; since the receiver needs to know these values—and not only the xðtiÞ—in order to be
able to decrypt the message, as the usual methods of discretization do not allow to obtain the
values of the derivative at the nodes ti in terms of the values of the function at such nodes. For
example, if one uses the Runge–Kutta method (see Ref. [4, Section 163]) to solve .x ¼ f ðt; x; ’xÞ;
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Fig. 3. Effects of a real communication channel: (a) plaintext; (b) recovered plaintext with channel bandwidth restricted
to o ¼ 6:28 rad=seg; (c) recovered plaintext with channel attenuation of 3 dB; (d) recovered plaintext with channel
noise of 40 dB; (e) recovered plaintext with channel bandwidth restricted to o ¼ 9:42 rad=seg; attenuation of 0:5 dB
and noise of 50 dB: The parameter values at the sender and receiver ends match exactly.
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then the values of the ﬁrst derivative are given by
’xðt0 þ hÞ ¼ ’xðt0Þ þ 16 ðk1 þ 2k2 þ 2k3 þ k4Þ; ð10Þ
k1 ¼ hf ðt0; xðt0Þ; ’xðt0ÞÞ; ð11Þ
k2 ¼ hf t0 þ 12 h; xðt0Þ þ
1
2
h ’xðt0Þ þ 18 hk1; ’xðt0Þ þ
1
2
k1
 
; ð12Þ
k3 ¼ hf t0 þ 12 h; xðt0Þ þ
1
2
h ’xðt0Þ þ 18 hk2; ’xðt0Þ þ
1
2
k2
 
; ð13Þ
k4 ¼ hf t0 þ h; xðt0Þ þ h ’xðt0Þ þ 12 hk3; ’xðt0Þ þ k3
 
: ð14Þ
We remark on the fact that the values for the second derivative should be computed from the
formula
.xðtiÞ ¼ f ðti; xðtiÞ; ’xðtiÞÞ; ð15Þ
where f is the function deﬁning the dynamic system N: This fact implies that the transmission has
a high factor expansion as every pulse of the original message is transmitted by means of triplets
of real numbers with a consistent number of decimals.
The second option consists in computing a much more long list of values xðsiÞ; i ¼ 0;y; m; with
mbn: In this case, the values for the ﬁrst derivative can be obtained from the formulae above; but
the second derivative should also be included in the transmission. Hence, in this case the
ciphertext is ðxðsiÞ; .xðsiÞÞ; i ¼ 0;y; m: What is gained in not sending the ﬁrst derivative is lost by
the greater number of entries of the list.
In any case, the values of the ﬁrst and second derivatives cannot be computed by the usual
approximate formulae
’xðtiÞE
xðtiþ1Þ  xðtiÞ
h
; ð16Þ
.xðtiÞE
xðtiþ2Þ  2xðtiþ1Þ þ xðtiÞ
h2
ð17Þ
as they produce considerable errors in the decryption process due to the non-linear terms in N:
4. Conclusion
As a consequence of the previous analysis, the cryptosystem studied cannot work in practice
because it is not using any synchronization mechanism and because it is not robust to real channel
conditions. On the other hand, the cryptosystem is rather weak, since it can be broken by using a
set of 114 parameter values only. The total lack of security, along with the lack of robustness,
discourages the use of this algorithm for secure applications.
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